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Legal Efficiency for Secured Transactions
Reform: Bridging the Gap Between
Economic Analysis and Legal Reasoning*
Frederique Dahan & John Simpson
INTRODUCTION
The case for the importance of law and institutions to boost
investment and access to credit does not have to be made. Other chapters
in this article have unambiguously demonstrated that secured
transactions and creditors' rights are among the most influential
measures. This need was acknowledged by the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union from the very beginning of
the transition process. Since 1990 a huge effort has been made to
transform their legal regimes. From the moment communism had
collapsed it was urgent to introduce the changes that were necessary to
develop modem market economies. The laws and institutions relating to
commercial transactions (such as the laws of contracts, companies,
property and insolvency) were hopelessly inadequate and economic
reform had to be accompanied by major programmes for legal reform.
Never before did so many legal systems have to change so much and in
such a short period of time.
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD or
the Bank) has engaged in many aspects of legal reform in the region. Its
involvement in secured transactions reform began in 1992 and has
continued every since. The objective of the Bank is to encourage
countries to modemise their secured transactions laws' and it offers
* Published November 2008. SECURED TRANSACTIONS REFORM AND ACCESS To
CREDIT (Frederique Dahan & John Simpson eds., 2008). Reprinted with Permission from
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. [Ed. Note: the citation format of the footnotes has been
modified to conform with THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION (Columbia
Law Review Ass'n et al. eds., 18th ed. 2005).]
1. In this article we use the term "secured transactions" to embrace all transactions
such as pledge and mortgage where the principal aim is to give security, not in the more
limited sense (as given in the USA under article 9, Uniform Commercial Code-Secured
Transactions) of relating only to security over movables.
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assistance at all stages of the reform process to achieve an effective legal
framework for secured transactions, building a consensus for those
reforms and then assisting in the preparation of necessary legislation and
the implementation of the law. To a large extent, this call has been heard
in Central and Eastern Europe. When the EBRD Secured Transactions
Regional Survey was published in 19992 most countries in the region had
undertaken reform on this part of their legal framework. By 2004, all of
the countries had done so. Yet, the assessment of their regimes is not
consistently positive. In fact, in some cases, despite what seems to have
been considerable efforts, users are still denouncing restrictions or
problems in the legal and institutional framework for secured
transactions. Why?
In this article we look at two questions that constantly arise and that
we have been able to observe while engaged in this reform work:
1. How do you define the precise objectives of a law
reform proposal and to ensure that they are adhered to
throughout the reform process;
2. How do you assess whether a law reform is successful?
To address the first question we will draw in particular on our
experiences of what happens in the transition countries of central and
eastern Europe when a secured transactions law is proposed. We do not
have the space for detailed case studies and we seek rather to give a
broad overview of how the reform process works (or fails to work).
Every reform project has its own list of successes and failures, and there
is always scope for presenting critical analyses of specific cases.
However when one takes the time to look back at what has been
achieved it is more constructive to do so in a sense of learning and
building on past experience. Our intention is not to draw attention to
past failings and mistakes but to look at the lessons that can be learnt
from the experiences of the past fifteen years. On the second question,
surprisingly little has been done to develop methods for assessing
whether a law reform is successful-or, to use other words, what makes
a secured transactions system "legally efficient." We will describe the
concept of "legal efficiency" and explain how we use that as the basis
both for establishing the objectives of reform and for evaluating the
result.
2. See EUR. BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEV., LAW IN TRANSITION: SECURED
TRANSACTIONS (2000), available at http://www.ebrd.com/pubs/legal/lit002.htm.
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Of course, both questions are linked. During the first part of this
article we will often refer to "efficient" laws and in the second part we
will put forward the criteria that may be used to determine what makes a
law "efficient." The primary reason for introducing a secured
transactions law is economic. Secured transactions are encouraged
because of the economic benefits that can be derived from them and the
law is needed first and foremost to enable those economic benefits to be
maximised. In spite of all the progress in collateral reform in recent
years there has been a failure to create a coherent and constructive
connection between the economic and the legal fundamentals and it is
this issue that we will try to address.
THE PROCESS OF LAW REFORM
The typical law reform can be divided into four stages:
a) consultation and decision to reform
b) designing and passing of legislation
c) establishing the necessary institutions and implementing
mechanisms
d) bringing the law into force.
Although these stages are interdependent, it is our experience that as the
process develops the focus tends to become hazy, with the objectives
somehow becoming lost and the gap between the economic and the legal
analysis widening, sometimes alarmingly.
Decision to Reform
There has to be agreement at a political level that a new law is
needed.3 In the case of secured transactions this is likely to be based on a
belief that a modem legal framework will boost the availability of credit
and investment. The decision to reform should be taken because of the
perceived benefits to the economy. If a finance ministry agrees to
include a secured transactions law in the legislative programme mainly in
order to placate a persistent international financial institution or other
external influential organisation, the reform will be off to a bad start.
There is a need for a broad consensus on the reasons for introducing the
reform and what it is aiming to achieve. The breadth and depth of the
decision-making process will often be critical for the reform's
subsequent phases.
3. This does not exclude that the reform initiative may have come initially from the
users and other stakeholders before being relayed to the executive (typically the
government) or the legislative (parliament).
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Usually one ministry or other agency (e.g. Central Bank) will
assume the task of developing the reform proposal. The approach at this
stage can vary greatly. Sometimes it is limited to taking the necessary
steps to obtain a government decision to adopt the proposal in principle
and to put the requisite legislation on the parliamentary agenda.
However, much more can be done to put the reform on the right track
and to increase the chances of a successful outcome. As with any
project, early preparation and management is likely to be well rewarded.
An understanding is required of the issues involved in the reform, the
options that will be faced and the possible broader implications of what
is proposed. Providing information to and seeking support from other
ministries and organisations who may be involved is more than just part
of the normal political process: it greatly facilitates subsequent work on
transforming the proposal into reality.
The Ministry of Justice and other sectors of the legal community
may merit special attention. Legal conservatism and a protectionist
attitude towards "legal traditions" can, if not appropriately managed,
become major obstacles to successful reform. Also at this stage external
support and technical assistance may be sought but it is essential to
understand that this assistance is precisely only technical: it cannot
substitute for what is primarily a policy and political decision.
The most important outcome of this stage should be a broad
consensus on what is to be achieved and the reasons for wanting to do so.
Our experience is that a spineless reform project is unlikely to get
strengthened at a later stage. A strong consensus at the outset on all of
the key aspects of the reform will provide a powerful force for
subsequently surmounting the many difficulties that will inevitably arise
as the reform proposal proceeds.
Designing and Passing Legislation
Law reform is not just about writing and adopting laws the other
stages are equally important. The process of preparing the necessary
legal texts and steering them through the adoption process is often a
lengthy and complex task and if it is badly managed the whole reform
may be jeopardised. The outcome of this stage should be a law or legal
provision that enable the desired reform to be implemented efficiently.
We look later at how "efficiency" can be gauged but here it is
appropriate to look at some of the factors that may impede this stage of
the law reform process.
[Vol. 27:3,4
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Losing Sight of the Objective
The lead players for preparing the legislation will most often be
lawyers because drafting laws is essentially a legal role. If the decision-
making process has been well prepared, the economic objectives of the
future law should be well analysed and presented. However that may not
be enough to ensure that the legal drafting team fully understand the
economic objectives and actively assess the draft they produce against
economic criteria. The Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs or the
Central Bank, or any other "champion" of the reform, needs not only to
remain involved but continually to monitor the drafts that are produced
against the economic rationale for the reform. Players from the financial
markets can usefully be consulted (see comments under market
resistance below). Secured transactions may not be rocket science, but
there are any number of details which, if not properly understood, could
steer the reform off track. Without good management of the drafting
process the law presented is likely to fare badly when assessed against
the legal efficiency criteria that we discuss below.
Legal Conservatism
The drafting of legislation is a difficult skill to acquire which is not
given to just any lawyer who is practised in drafting the legal documents
required by his clients. It requires a deep understanding of the purpose
of the law, an ability to visualise the effect that the draft law may have on
the existing body of laws and, most importantly, a capacity to relate the
law proposed to existing and future market practice. It is this capacity to
perceive the way in which the law will support (or fail to support) market
transactions that is especially important and also quite rare. It should be
possible to develop the requisite qualities within the drafting team, but
the same cannot necessarily be expected for other lawyers who are
consulted or who express views on the draft. Lawyers from their very
training are likely to view with suspicion any departure from existing
legal rules. The protection of legal tradition and the integrity of the legal
system is to be encouraged but they have to be balanced against the need
of markets to move forward. Regrettably it happens all too frequently
that lawyers who contribute to the legislative debate make little attempt
to achieve that balance, and indeed often have little understanding of the
economic objectives of the law.
Market Resistance
It sometimes comes as a surprise that resistance to the introduction
of an efficient secured transactions law comes from the persons who
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could be expected to derive the most benefit from it. Banks, lenders and
other creditors who give input at the drafting stage will not always be
favourably disposed to the reform, or to some of the features that are
precisely designed to make it efficient. They may require some
persuading that from their perspective the proposed changes will be
preferable to the existing market practice. The lure of increased credit
activity may be tempered by fears of increased competition and lower
margins. The problem may be compounded if the persons giving input
are not the managers who are capable of understanding the broad
economic picture but representatives from the legal department who are
more concerned at how to document a transaction than its justification in
a wider context. Even bankers may not understand all the reasons
underpinning the reform. In one country recently, provisions in the draft
pledge law designed to facilitate taking security for syndicated loans
were struck out because of opposition from bankers who did not
understand what a syndicated loan was, or assumed that it was
undesirable or unnecessary in the local market.
The solution however is not to restrict consultation, rather to adapt
the way in which it is carried out. If economists, bankers and investors,
especially those who have been exposed to modern market practices, are
not given a guardian role in the reform at the drafting stage it will be all
the more difficult to keep the implementation on track later. The fact
that the banking sector in Central and Eastern Europe has seen a large
strategic participation of foreign investors should facilitate the
introduction of modern market practices. Paradoxically, because the
domestic markets in many Western European countries have been
protected from external influences and thus slow to introduce modern
techniques, resistance can sometimes come from those foreign
dominated banks who do not understand why the transition country
should need a "modern" secured transactions law and prefer to see
replicated the system they are used to in their home country.
Incompatibility of Technical Assistance and Foreign Input
In transition countries considerable technical support has been given
for secured transactions law reform from national and supra-national
providers of technical assistance (of which EBRD is one). Although
much of that assistance has been efficient and has contributed to the
success of reform, it has also to be admitted that the nature of the
assistance and the way it is provided sometimes falls short of what could
be expected. The role of the technical assistance provider is a delicate
one. It is there to provide expertise, practical advice and guidance using
experience of reforms elsewhere, and to ensure that the original
[Vol. 27:3,4
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objectives of the reform decision drive the process. It can also bring
additional resources that would not otherwise be available. Its role is to
assist, not to dictate or impose.
We put forward a few guidelines for assistance providers:
1) The drafting should be done by local lawyers. The law
will have to fit in to the existing legal framework and
someone who is not from the jurisdiction, however
knowledgeable, is ill-placed to draft it. It is also desirable
that local lawyers acquire a full understanding of all the
issues and accept responsibility for the draft. A home-
grown product, as opposed to a foreign implant, will
engender a sense of achievement and with that should
come a greater commitment to defend it and to see it
properly implemented over time. A very good example
of this is found in Bulgaria, where the 1998 Pledge Law
was developed by Bulgarian lawyers, who understood
very well the objectives of the reform and are still
actively following up on how the system is faring.
2) The temptation to import foreign law concepts should be
resisted. In a civil law country you cannot, for example,
introduce a trust by sleight of hand. It may take longer
but the drafters have to understand fully each aspect of
the result desired from the reform and then work out how
they can be achieved in the context of their own legal
tradition and institutions. Foreign examples will certainly
be a source of inspiration but will also be a source of
confusion and inefficiency if imported without adaptation
and reconstruction in order to fit to the local environment.
Perhaps the worst sin is when assistance providers
produce a draft in their own language substantially based
on their own law and then present a translation of that
draft as the law to be adopted. This caricature of
technical assistance has for the most part now disappeared
in Central and Eastern Europe but unfortunately the
negative effects can still be felt. In fairness to technical
assistance providers, the fault does not always lie with
them. In some instances, a ready-made product is what
the developing country will request and expect to be
given.
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3) Some understanding of the local legal tradition is
essential. Ideally the assistance provider will mobilise
experts who speak the local language and be well versed
in the local law and practice. In practice that will not
often be feasible but the assistance provider needs as a
minimum to acquire a basic understanding of the
approach of the local law and practice. Without that he
will operate under a severe handicap.
4) The approach should be dispassionate and impartial.
Once again the underlying philosophy is to encourage and
support the local ownership of the project. The assistance
provider is there to help develop a consensus on the
reform objectives which is compatible with the original
rationale and then to ensure that those objectives are
translated into the legal system with maximum efficiency.
The issues need to be presented in a manner which is
balanced and conducive to rational decision. One of the
more difficult aspects of the international expert's work is
to detach himself from his legal roots, to present legal
issues objectively. Every lawyer is conditioned by his
legal training and may tend sub-consciously to believe
that his own law is superior but that has to be resisted. It
is sad to witness how often well-meaning lawyers
working on law reform in transition countries press for
solutions based on their own law, when with a little
objective analysis it can be seen that the solution
proposed is not appropriate for the local context or that
other routes may be just as valid.4
Once finalised the draft law will pass through the parliamentary
process. At this stage the drafting team needs to be vigilant to ensure
that the draft does not fall victim to the uncertainties and excesses of the
political process. One of the greatest dangers is amendments made at
this stage by politicians who have their own agenda which may have
4. When the secured transactions project was set up at EBRD in 1992 a policy was
introduced that there should always be in the team at least one lawyer from a common
law background and one from a civil law background. The transition countries are civil
law based but much of modem financial practice is inspired by common law solutions.
That policy has been conscientiously pursued ever since and it has certainly had a
considerable influence on all of EBRD's work in this field. If you have to discuss and
agree issues across legal boundaries in-house, you are that much better prepared to adopt
an open-minded approach when working in a local jurisdiction.
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little to do with the issues covered by the law. However if the draft has
been well prepared, objectives are clear, consultation process wide, and
the presentation is persuasive, the chances are that political battles will
not interfere with the adoption of the law.
Establishing the Necessary Institutions
Institutions will be established to enable the new law to operate. In
the case of a secured transactions law a registration or "notice filing"
system is needed and viable and efficient procedures have to be
established to enable the security to be enforced. Often at this stage the
people involved will change. Drafting a law is high profile, even more
so if it involves amending the Civil Code, and may attract considerable
high level interest. Setting up a pledge register is definitely not sexy
work and may be left to administrators and IT experts. If they do not
have a proper grasp of why the register is being established and the
implications its use will have on market practice, there is a risk that
inefficiencies will be introduced through superfluous or inappropriate
requirements. The instinctive approach of a registrar towards pledge
registration may be quite different to that intended by the law. If he is
not properly briefed on the purpose and aims of the law he may, for
example, build a title registration system modelled on a land register,
which would definitely not be an efficient way of publicising pledges.
Similarly enforcement procedures often lose sight of the
fundamental objective in the context of secured transactions, which is of
achieving a rapid sale of the assets given as security at a high price.
There are many opportunities for creating overly bureaucratic public
auction and other procedures, which provide "protections" which are of
little benefit to the debtor or creditor who are party to the enforcement.
The gap between the economic analysis which underlays the original
reform decision and the mindset of those developing the register or the
enforcement procedure is sometimes alarmingly wide, especially when
those responsible for the initial reform initiative have moved on to other
things and fail to ensure effective follow through.
Bringing the Law into Force
Once the new law enters into force the task of making the new
regime work in practice is entrusted to market players, institutional
administrators and, in the final count, judges. How it works will be
determined, to a large extent, by how the new regime is explained, and
the support and guidance that is given to those to whom it is entrusted.
Lawyers and bankers may be happier with the old system they were
familiar with and slow to realise, or fearful of, the scope the reform gives
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for new deals. As with any new product the way it is introduced into the
market may be just as important as the quality of the product itself.
Often those active in the reform process will have moved on to the next
task and there are few resources available to analyse whether all the
effort bears fruit. A common problem is the lack of a good
understanding of the new law by those who will apply it at the moment
when it is most needed: the courts. Unfortunately, it is rare for the
judiciary to be closely involved in developing the reform from the outset.
The danger is that the courts may then not grasp the effect (or intended
effect) of the law and interpret it in a narrow or limitative way.
Much can be done to assist at this stage: education and awareness
programmes, dissemination of promotional and explanatory material,
training programmes, pioneer transactions sponsored by IFIs, and
monitoring of the way the law is working (or not working) in practice
against what was intended. The idea that the reform will be perfectly
applied first time is a myth, especially in the fragile and fast-changing
environment of a transition country. Reform is a continuing and gradual
process and after any major step is taken, such as the introduction of a
new law, careful monitoring is necessary to identify problems and find
solutions. Inevitably the legal implementation of a law will not always
correspond to the underlying economic rationale. If discrepancies are
addressed rapidly solutions can most often be found relatively simply. If
they are left to develop there is a danger that they can eventually
jeopardise the success of the reform. In Poland the pledge law when
introduced in 1996 was a good example of a modem pledge law but, in
contrast to neighbouring countries that introduced similar laws, it has
failed to deliver the expected benefits precisely because of the way it has
been implemented.5
In order to be effective, the nature and purpose of the monitoring
and evaluating task has to be clearly understood. It is not a policing task
aimed at disciplining those that do not behave as intended, nor is it a kind
of audit to enable the external assistance provider to verify the success of
the project. It is more in the nature of an active after-sales service
designed to ensure that the new product works, that its users derive
maximum benefit from it and that the economic benefits that were
assumed from the reform indeed materialise. It requires encouragement
and support from the reform's champion since it can only be successful
when it is underwritten by a commitment to carry it through effectively.
It also requires sound methodology and benchmarking, and this leads us
5. See EUR. BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEv., THE IMPACT OF THE LEGAL
FRAMEWORK ON THE SECURED CREDIT MARKET IN POLAND (2005), available at
http://www.ebrd.com/country/sector/law/st/facts/nbpeng.pdf
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to the second part of this article-the question of how a reform's success
can be assessed.
ASSESSING THE SUCCESS OF REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF LEGAL
EFFICIENCY
The process of reform is not an easy one. It is hampered in
particular by an often inadequate analysis of what the reform is aiming to
achieve and a lack of clear directions to guide the work as it progresses.
Government proposes a law on secured transactions in order to facilitate
access to credit. A team of local and foreign experts help the
government prepare the necessary legislation, which is duly passed. A
different set of government employees and external contractors establish
a register or notice filing system and a public auction procedure.
Everyone has done their job, the reform is complete and yet, the result in
terms of facilitating access to credit may fall well short of what was
intended. Or, as is most often the case, nobody has a clear idea of what
the result of the reform actually is. What is missing are the constant and
well-defined goals which determine the direction of the process and
ensure that it leads to the desired result.
A lawyer who is drafting a pledge law or an administrator who is
setting up a pledge registration system needs to be given a clear picture
of the end objective, not just as a technical description of the law or
register, but also by way of indication of the ways in which it should
actually facilitate access to credit. In this way he gains an understanding
of the broader issues involved, including the economic function of the
law, and will realise that the outside world will be judging the law or
register with these in mind. In practice surprisingly often that is not the
case.
In order to address this gap we use the concept of legal efficiency.
What do we mean by "legal efficiency"? We use it as indicating the
extent to which a law and the way it is used provides the benefits that it
was intended to achieve. We look at the concept against the background
of secured transactions law because we prefer to link it to our direct
experience in transition countries, but we believe it is capable of much
wider application.
As mentioned before, the prime purpose of a law regulating pledge
or mortgage is economic, since the secured credit market has essentially
an economic function, (whilst recognising that it may also have
important social functions and consequences); and it is essentially
facilitative since a secured credit market is not a necessity, it being
possible for any jurisdiction to function without it. We work on the
premise that the basic legal framework should be conducive to a flexible
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market for secured credit. There are also social issues, for example
relating to consumer credit and housing, but the driving force behind the
introduction of a law on secured transactions is the benefits that it is
expected to bring to the economy.
A relatively simple indicator of the success of a secured transactions
law reform (or primary motive for undertaking the secured transactions
law reform) would be the subsequent increase in the volume of secured
lending. This is a crude and narrow indicator, inadequate by itself. The
intended function of the secured credit market may be more than just to
boost the amount of credit granted against security. It may also include,
for example, opening up credit to new sectors of society, encouraging
new housing construction, or allowing privately-funded infrastructure
projects.
The intended function of a law has to be looked at in the context
within which it is to operate. Its ramifications have to be considered not
just in economic terms but in social and cultural terms as well. An
appropriate balance has to be found between fulfilling the law's
economic purpose and ensuring that the effects of the law are acceptable
in context. The purpose of the reform needs to be carefully analysed and
agreed at the outset, failing which the potential achievements of the law
in terms of legal efficiency may be curtailed. It sometimes happens that
the goals of the reform are not clearly defined, or that they are not
perceived in the same way by all persons involved. That can be fatal to
the subsequent implementation. Without well-defined and accepted
goals there cease to be unambiguous criteria against which the reform
can be assessed. The boat is sailing with no sense of direction and it is
unlikely it will reach port safely.
Legal Efficiency Criteria
We analyse legal efficiency by looking at the degree to which the
legal framework enables secured transactions:
a) first, to achieve their basic function and
b) secondly, to operate in a way which maximises economic
benefit.
And, as shown in the table, we break the second criterion into five
separate headings: simplicity, cost, speed, certainty and fit-to-context.
[Vol. 27:3,4
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Table: Criteria for legal efficiency of secured transactions law
The basic legal function of a secured transactions law is to allow
the creation of a security right over assets which, in the case of non-
payment of a debt, entitles the creditor to have the assets realised and to
have the proceeds applied towards satisfaction of his claim prior to
claims of other creditors. If a secured transactions law only gives the
creditor a personal right but no right in the assets, or if there is no right to
enforcement, or no priority vis-d-vis other creditors, the law fails to
achieve its basic legal function. An absolute priority for taxes and other
state claims ahead of the secured creditor, or the right in insolvency of
ordinary creditors to share in a portion of the proceeds, are more than
inefficiencies in the secured transactions law, they are defects which
prevent it from fully achieving its basic function. They may be
intentional (a super-priority of the state usually is) but they reflect a
compromise between two laws with conflicting purposes. Any such
compromise inevitably inhibits the effective operation of the secured
transactions law and introduces uncertainty into the minds of lenders.
If the legal framework for secured transactions is to operate in a
way which maximises economic benefit, the system for creation and
enforcement of pledge or mortgage should be simple, fast and
inexpensive, there should be certainty as to what the law is and how it is
applied, and it should function in a manner which fits to the local
context.
Simplicity--Simple does not mean simplistic: it is necessary to
strike a balance between simplicity and the sophistication required by the
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market. In many countries complexities have developed and become
entrenched over time as laws have been adapted to new circumstances,
not because of the sophistication of these circumstances but rather from
inherent limitations of the legal system. There exists in transition
countries a huge opportunity to reduce down to the essential elements
and to introduce laws which are directly adapted to modem market
requirements. Part of simplicity comes from the lack of restrictions and
barriers. If the law is to facilitate the use of secured credit it needs to
provide a base which offers the necessary flexibility to adapt with the
trends of the market.
Speed-For most aspects of the legal process, the less time it takes
the more efficient it is. There are exceptions: a notice period or a cooling
off period has to be of appropriate length, but for registration of a pledge
or mortgage, for example, there can only be benefits if it takes only a few
minutes rather a month, and a lender who knows that enforcement of the
pledge or mortgage is likely to take several years will derive less comfort
from his security.
Cost-Legal costs almost inevitably have an adverse impact on the
economic benefit of a transaction. Delay, complexity and uncertainty all
tend to add to costs so there is a close relation with the other aspects of
legal efficiency. Some costs are, at least to an extent, within the control
of the parties. Before taking legal advice on structuring a transaction the
parties can assess the value of doing so. The cost of legal advice on a
complicated transaction may be outweighed by the benefits, but the cost
of legal advice incurred because of defects in the legal framework always
reduces efficiency, as do fixed costs (for example registration, notary or
court fees).
One does not have to be an economist to understand that if the legal
procedures for creating and enforcing a pledge or mortgage are slow,
expensive and complex, the cost of secured credit will be higher and the
economic benefit of using pledge or mortgage reduced. There are
however two other elements that need to be taken into account when
assessing legal efficiency. They are sometimes overlooked by
economists because they are more difficult to translate into quantifiable
indicators but they are critical to the success of a legal system.
Certainty-Certainty is a critical element of any sound legal
system. A grain of uncertainty in the legal position can have a pervasive
and disproportionate effect. Once a banker hears that there is some
doubt in the legal robustness of a transaction, he will fast become
hesitant. The difficulty is one of measurement. If the legal uncertainty
relating to a pledge or mortgage could be stated, for example, as a five
per cent chance of proceeds on enforcement being reduced, with the
amount of the reduction being on average twenty per cent, the risk would
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be quantified and it would become easier to manage as there would be
relative certainty. In reality legal opinions cannot be expressed in that
way and the natural reaction to unquantifiable uncertainty is extreme
caution. Transparency can often strengthen certainty: for instance, easy
access for all to information in the land register allows potential
mortgage lenders to find out about the property and any other mortgages
that may be claimed.
Fit-to-context-The "fit-to-context" criterion is the most elusive
but nonetheless important since it covers a number of facets. Simplicity,
cost, speed and certainty are all concepts which are relatively easy to
understand and to relate to economic benefit. The "fit-to-context"
concept however merits more explanation. It is not enough to adopt a
law which establishes clearly and unambiguously a simple, fast and
inexpensive regime for pledge or mortgage security. The efficient
functioning of the law will also depend on whether it is adapted to the
economic, social and legal context within which it is to operate. It needs,
for example:
a) To respond to the economic need: Markets are
constantly changing, and the law has to be able to
adapt to new products, as for example when loans are
proposed with flexible interest rates;
b) b) To fit to the broader financial context within which
the law operates: For example, the rules applicable to
transfers and pledges of secured loans should not
hamper the use of mortgage-backed securities and
covered bonds and the secured transactions law should
take into account the way in which pledge is used for
securitisation transactions involving unsecured loans
and other assets;
c) c) To fit with existing market practice: Whereas much
can be learned from other markets, a law has to be
compatible with existing market and legal practice and
to give confidence to those who rely on it;
d) To achieve an appropriate balance between fulfilling
the economic purpose and ensuring that the effects of
the reform are acceptable in context: The rights of
consumers and occupiers of property to appropriate
protection cannot be eliminated to suit the economic
needs of the secured transactions law, rather they have
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to be framed in a way which enables borrowers and
lenders to derive the benefits afforded by a flourishing
secured credit market while at the same time ensuring
the necessary protections to persons in a vulnerable
position.
e) To achieve particular objectives of the law: For
example, the law may aim to extend secured lending to
a wide range of banks as opposed to creating a lending
cartel, or to reduce constraints on the types of pledge
and mortgage product that can be offered.
Legal Efficiency and the Functional Approach
An issue which can be used to illustrate the importance of the fit-to-
context criterion is the functional approach to security interests over
movable property. This was originally introduced under Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code in the USA. During the first half of the
twentieth century there had developed a vast range of different rules and
practices in the US that were applied for securing claims using movable
property. In an attempt to introduce some order into what had become a
somewhat chaotic and highly complex field of law, Article 9 provided
for a unique set of rules, governing creation, notice filing, priority and
enforcement, for all transactions whose function was to create a security
interest in movable assets. Those rules apply irrespective of the form of
the agreement between the parties if the substance of the transaction is to
create a security interest. For example, an agreement between a buyer
and seller of goods for title in the goods only to pass to the buyer upon
full payment for the goods would not be effective as such, but would
create a security interest over the goods with title passing to the buyer
and the seller having a pledge in the goods.
In the context of the US in the 1950s the functional approach under
Article 9 no doubt met the fit-to-context criterion. It was a key to
providing a cure to the defects of the system that had prevailed until then
and the sophisticated American market was able to understand it and
apply it. In the very different context of transition countries the
functional approach may be assessed otherwise. They have a lack, rather
than a surfeit, of devices and practices for taking security. The
introduction of a sophisticated concept of definition by reference to
substance not form, and the recharacterisation of transactions that can
result, does not fit easily with a civil law system and brings with it
unnecessary complexity and uncertainty. Western European countries do
not have a functional approach: England has recently rejected the
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proposal that such system would be of benefit. Retention of title and
financial leasing, fixed and floating charges, for example are used
extensively. A country from central or eastern Europe thus needs to
reflect carefully before adopting an approach which would bring
considerable complexity and would touch on fundamental elements of its
legal system such as freedom of contract 6 and ownership rights7, whilst
being diametrically different from the approach taken by its neighbours.
A few transition countries have adopted a functional approach (for
example, Albania, Kosovo and Montenegro). No clear assessment has
been made of the effect but anecdotal evidence suggests that the meaning
of the relevant provisions has not been understood and that they are
largely ignored in practice.
Measuring Legal Efficiency
Legal efficiency is thus relevant both when defining the general and
detailed objectives for the reform and when subsequently measuring
what has been achieved. A basic assessment whether a law maximises
economic benefit may appear relatively simple. If the law enables a
pledge or mortgage to be taken, and if necessary enforced, simply,
quickly and cheaply the cost of security by way of pledge or mortgage is
minimised and the benefit of the security is maximised. As we showed
above, there are broader aspects that also have to be taken into account.
Legal inefficiency may not merely reduce the economic benefit that
might otherwise result from the law (for example a lower interest rate for
a secured loan compared to that of an unsecured loan), it may also have a
dissuasive effect. This is particularly pertinent to factors where the
economic impact is difficult to measure. If the legal process is complex
or takes a long time, or if there is uncertainty, potential players may
never pass the decision threshold and not proceed with the transaction at
all. If a few people take that line the impact may be multiplied as their
conduct influences others.
Measuring legal efficiency is clearly challenging and any attempt to
develop an accurate scientific basis is unlikely to be convincing.
However, a close examination of a legal system against the legal
efficiency criteria listed above can provide indicators of how efficient the
system is. EBRD has done this for mortgage law in transition countries8
6. A contract for a financial lease or a credit sale or retention of title would be
recharacterised as a pledge.
7. An agreement which purports to govern transfer of ownership has the effect of
creating a pledge.
8. See EUR. BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEV., MORTGAGES IN TRANSITION
ECONOMIES (2008), available at www.ebrd.com/pubs/legal/mit.htm.
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and it gives an interesting comparative insight into the strengths and
weaknesses of existing legal regimes.
CONCLUSION
In most transition countries the basic reforms of the legal regimes
for pledge and mortgage are well advanced, but there remains much
work to do to assess those regimes and to fine-tune them to ensure that
secured credit markets are supported by laws that are appropriate and
conducive to the operation of the market for the mutual benefit of lenders
and borrowers. We believe that the failure to define the general and
detailed objectives of a reform and subsequently to measure what has
been achieved against those objectives often prevents emerging markets
from realising the advantages they should derive from legal reform
programmes. The use of legal efficiency criteria provides a basis for
bridging the gap between economic analysis and legal reasoning.
